Designed-in security for cyber-physical systems by Peisert, S et al.
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
Recent Work
Title
Designed-in security for cyber-physical systems
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3d8895mn
Journal
IEEE Security and Privacy, 12(5)
ISSN
1540-7993
Authors
Peisert, S
Margulies, J
Nicol, DM
et al.
Publication Date
2014
DOI
10.1109/MSP.2014.90
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
ROUNDTABLE
1540-7993/14/$31.00 © 2014 IEEE Copublished by the IEEE Computer and Reliability Societies September/October 2014 9
Designed-in Security for 
Cyber-Physical Systems
Sean Peisert | Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory  
and University of California, Davis
Jonathan Margulies | Qmulos
David M. Nicol | University of Illinois 
Himanshu Khurana | Honeywell 
Chris Sawall | Ameren
An Academic’s 
Perspective: 
David M. Nicol
T here are at least two typesof security vulnerabili-
ties: flawed or insufficient soft-
ware behavior specifications that 
allow compromise—for example, 
authentication that is lacking or 
that can be spoofed—and incorrect 
implementation of specifications—
buffer overflows being a classic 
example and Heartbleed being a 
notable recent one. 
The sad truth is that the state 
of the art in specification develop-
ment and implementation doesn’t 
deliver secure software. So the 
question is, what does designed-in 
security mean in each case—for 
CPSs in particular—and what are 
the challenges?
For software implementation, 
designed-in security includes pro-
gramming language features that 
enhance security. Many security-
enhancing programming language 
ideas have been proposed, but none 
have had traction in CPSs. Type-
checking of data objects passed 
through interfaces is an example; 
at compile time and potentially at 
runtime, the runtime system ana-
lyzes which objects pass between 
software modules or routines and 
ensures that what’s passed looks 
like what’s expected. Types can 
have attributes, which let us specify 
interfaces whether encryption or 
authentication is required. 
However, this kind of dynamic 
introspection takes time. A CPS’s 
software component usually runs 
in a real-time control loop, which 
means it must be fast enough to 
keep up with a schedule. In addi-
tion, the software must have a 
predictable execution time, and fea-
tures such as automatic garbage col-
lection impede that. Yet, dynamic 
memory management errors are a 
common source of vulnerabilities. 
My hope is that we can discover 
a sweet spot in the spectrum of pro-
gramming language features that 
gives real-time system designers suf-
ficient speed, predictable behavior, 
and features that enhance security. 
I would also hope for widespread 
adoption of such a language by the 
energy industry. Frankly, I think the 
latter problem is more difficult owing 
to the many understandable but very 
real business impediments to change, 
such as the immaturity of such tech-
nology and a lack of vendor support.
T he November/December 2014 issue of IEEE Security & Privacy will focus on control system security in the energy industry. As a preview, guest editors 
Sean Peisert and Jonathan Margulies hosted a roundtable discussion featuring 
three experts from the energy sector—David M. Nicol, Himanshu Khurana, 
and Chris Sawall—who offer different perspectives on the meaning and chal-
lenges of “designed-in security”: one from academia, one from a cyber-physical 
system (CPS) provider, and one from an end asset owner and user. 
Like the parable of the blind men and the elephant, we get three fairly 
distinct viewpoints. The academic highlights foundational issues and talks 
about emerging technology that can help us design and implement secure 
software in CPSs. The provider’s view includes components of the academic 
view but emphasizes the secure system development process and the stan-
dards that the system must satisfy. The user issues a call to action and offers 
ideas that will ensure progress. 
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When I think of designed-in 
security for system specification, 
I think of various types of system 
models and the interaction of com-
ponents and security policies, for 
example, formal languages that 
model a protocol and prove certain 
properties about it. The academic 
landscape has many knolls of 
activity outside CPS, and in some 
(usually limited) cases, impressive 
results are possible, such as formal 
verification of programs written in a 
particular subset of the C language. 
However, adding a physical compo-
nent introduces new complexities 
and requirements for such formal 
analyses, because the environment 
in which the software runs can 
affect system behavior, which itself 
can be an attack vector. Manipu-
lated, corrupted, or spoofed sen-
sor reading values could push the 
software system into a state that 
it’s designed to enter—perhaps 
 unintentionally—and have delete-
rious consequences.
More research is necessary in 
areas such as increasing confidence 
in sensor readings by checking con-
sistency with other sensors and 
information sources as well as vali-
dating control system commands 
by precomputing their impact using 
a physical system model. Some of 
these goals are now reachable at a 
rudimentary level in an industrial 
context—for example, Khurana 
and I worked on a proposal to the 
Department of Energy to perform 
consistency checking on electri-
cal distribution system commands. 
However, I don’t see sufficient busi-
ness drivers for the energy industry 
to develop this kind of research. The 
government will have to lead.
A Provider’s 
Perspective: 
Himanshu Khurana
C PSs have computational and physical components where 
sensing, data, analytics, and control 
come together to add value across 
a range of industries, including the 
smart grid, intelligent buildings, 
healthcare monitoring, autono-
mous vehicles, and smart manufac-
turing. These systems, built from 
various engineering components, 
must realize application-driven 
functionality and satisfy a range of 
nonfunctional properties including 
safety, reliability, and security. Secu-
rity is a key risk and concern but 
suffers from a lack of precise objec-
tives, solutions, and measures. 
Today, the industry’s key issues 
are defining designed-in security, 
designing and developing accord-
ingly, dealing with the absorbed 
risks, and incorporating improved 
solutions as they emerge. If we do 
these well, we can establish good 
synergy between industry deploy-
ment and research improvements. 
We observed this cycle in the IT 
industry; however, things might 
play out differently in the CPS 
industry owing to its product life 
cycles—for instance, there’s still 
a gap between consumer-driven 
two-year smartphone upgrades 
and that sensing and control box in 
the ceiling of every floor of every 
commercial building, which might 
not be replaced for another decade. 
Some people call this the legacy 
problem, but it’s more than that—
though perhaps this is a topic for 
another conversation.
Let’s break down the problem 
of designed-in security for CPS 
into a few bite-sized chunks. From 
a systems perspective, designed-in 
security involves, at a minimum, 
requirements, solution engineering 
and composition, and verification 
and maturity (or improvement). 
Security requirements come 
from various sources such as reg-
ulation, government-sponsored 
frameworks, industry consortiums, 
standards, asset owner specifica-
tions, and so on. These require-
ments are a good step forward and 
facilitate increasingly secure solu-
tions. There’s a lot of overlap across 
these requirements frameworks, 
and as we develop them further, we 
should explore the realization of a 
common framework. Furthermore, 
to address boundary issues, the 
Our Roundtable Participants
Himanshu KhuranaDavid M. Nicol Chris Sawall
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frameworks should clarify roles and 
responsibilities across the solution 
chain, from asset owner to compo-
nent provider. 
Realizing solutions typically 
involves combining many compo-
nents sourced from many providers 
and then deploying, configuring, 
and managing them correctly. Com-
ponents include sensors, actuators, 
computational hardware, firmware, 
operating systems, applications, 
and networking subsystems. We 
worry about the security of smart-
phone systems (and rightfully so) 
that are developed by a few key ven-
dors and manufactured at a few key 
sites. Compare that to the plethora 
of CPSs that might be developed by 
hundreds of providers and manu-
factured in as many sites. Without 
doubt, a subset of CPS components 
won’t satisfy desired security prop-
erties, so part of the challenge is 
designing with a little bit of insecu-
rity. We can manage this with care-
ful architectural considerations and 
by employing roots of trust for key 
decisions and control functions. 
Secure composition meth-
ods play an important role; Nicol 
outlined some nice development 
methods and tools currently 
under exploration. In IT systems, 
we often address component and 
configuration weaknesses with 
continuous security monitoring 
and incident response. Adoption 
of equivalent CPS solutions is 
increasing, and this is a good direc-
tion for further efforts. 
I often think about verifica-
tion and maturity as a continuum. 
Today, we verify CPS security using 
threat modeling, code reviews, 
and various white/gray/black-box 
testing tools, giving us a sense of 
requirements compliance, signifi-
cant mitigation of known attack 
vectors, and somewhat limited 
mitigation of unknown attack vec-
tors. We can enhance this approach 
by integrating maturity goals so we 
always know how much we want to 
improve in the next version, be it a 
product or network. To that end, I 
support recent maturity framework 
development efforts in CPS secu-
rity. As researchers develop more 
quantifiable metrics and practical 
assessment tools, we’ll see improve-
ment in verification as well as our 
confidence in the security of the 
overall solution. 
A User’s Perspective: 
Chris Sawall
A lthough I agree with what my partners said, I feel we could 
be more simplistic. Designed-in 
security means that all products, 
solutions, technology, and so forth, 
are designed with security con-
cepts in mind. We should employ 
a security development life cycle. 
Many companies state that quality 
is the number-one goal, yet they 
don’t always consider basic secu-
rity requirements. Isn’t cybersecu-
rity a core requirement for a quality 
product? Without it, as both Nicol 
and Khurana stated, there are 
flaws—potential for system com-
promise or failure.
Designed-in security should 
extend beyond the individual device 
or application to the entire system 
(or group of devices or networks). 
Many control systems are imple-
mented as a complete turnkey sys-
tem; designed-in security must 
apply to this entire system. Although 
control systems’ core functionality is 
to run a plant or other critical infra-
structure or manufacturing facility, 
they must be resilient, safe, secure, 
and reliable. A built-in layered secu-
rity model would help prevent any 
one system failure or compromise 
from having a cataclysmic effect on 
the entire control system.
However, cybersecurity comes 
at a cost. Generally speaking, ven-
dors put into their products only 
what their customers want and 
what they know will sell; they want 
a return on investment. The indus-
try is very proactive in protecting 
assets. In fact, many companies in 
the energy sector have asked that 
security be integrated into their 
vendor solutions, and many ven-
dors have heard the call to arms. It 
took a while to get movement, but 
the movement has begun and is a 
great first step. 
But what next? Are cyberse-
curity controls in one solution as 
good as another? Must compa-
nies patch critical security vulner-
abilities or face a voided warranty? 
Some industry professionals have 
discussed an “underwriter’s labo-
ratory”–like evaluation and “seal of 
approval” for vendor solutions and 
technology. A centralized entity 
that reviews technology to verify 
key security controls would be an 
excellent step forward, providing 
the industry with normalized vali-
dation that ensures a robust solu-
tion with security designed into it. 
In addition, this centralized entity 
could help validate that patches 
and upgrades don’t compromise 
system stability. 
Creating a group like this won’t 
be easy. And there are several con-
cerns with this thinking, such as the 
fact that it’s only a point-in-time 
evaluation. A worst-case scenario 
is creating a false sense of security 
whereby consumers believe they’re 
protected, with a validated and 
approved security architecture and 
system, yet fail to understand that 
attackers will always work to be one 
step ahead and will eventually find a 
flaw to compromise. Perhaps a mid-
dle ground exists. 
Energy is one of the strongest 
critical infrastructure sectors, with 
significant peer collaboration as 
well as several committees, work-
ing groups, and research projects. 
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Only by working with vendors and 
other partners on a common goal 
will the industry solve this problem. 
 e industry can’t do it alone, and 
vendors can’t work in silos assuming 
they know what’s needed or what 
will work. 
Great work has already been 
done and a vision set. In 2011, the 
Energy Sector Control Systems 
Working Group published the 
“Roadmap to Achieve Energy Deliv-
ery System Cybersecurity” (h p://
energy.gov/sites/prod/ les/Energy 
Delivery Systems Cybersecurity 
Roadmap_ nalweb.pdf), which 
o ers the following vision: “By 2020, 
resilient energy delivery systems are 
designed, installed, operated, and 
maintained to survive a cyber inci-
dent while sustaining critical func-
tions.” Without designed-in security 
or industry collaboration, we have 
no chance of achieving this vision.  
W e thank the panelists for taking the time to give 
their perspectives on the meaning 
and challenges of designed-in secu-
rity as it pertains to cyber-physical 
systems in the energy sector.  e 
insights from everyone, as well as 
the distinctions, have made for a 
very enlightening discussion. 
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